The rule against anticipation

20.13Formerly, the House strictly observed a rule against anticipation, according to which a motion could not anticipate a matter already appointed for consideration by the House,1 whether a bill or an adjourned debate upon a motion. The rule survives in Standing Order No 28, which requires that in determining whether a discussion is out of order on the ground of anticipation the Speaker must have regard to the probability of the matter anticipated being brought before the House within a reasonable time.2

Stated generally, the rule against anticipation (which applied to other proceedings as well as motions), as strictly enforced in earlier times, was that a matter must not be anticipated if contained in a more effective form of proceeding than the proceeding by which it was sought to be anticipated,3 but it might be anticipated if contained in an equally or less effective form. A bill or other order of the day is more effective than a motion, a substantive motion more effective than an unamendable motion expressed in general terms or a motion for the adjournment of the House or an amendment, and a general debate or a motion for the adjournment is more effective than a supplementary question.4

In recent years there have been several occasions when the rule has not been applied in particular instances.5 It remains the practice, however, that if a Member declares their intention of raising a matter on the adjournment during question time, further supplementary questions are precluded even where the Member has not yet been allowed a specific opportunity for an adjournment debate.6

Footnotes

  1. 1. Parl Deb (1907) 171, c 1525; ibid 176, c 631; ibid (1908) 192, c 228; HC Deb (1911) 29, c 1362; ibid 32, c 2706; ibid (1914) 61, c 172; ibid (1924–25) 180, c 1231; ibid (1981–82) 12, c 672.
  2. 2. For a discussion of the origins of the rule, including a suggestion that the earliest reference to it is to be found in Dickens' Little Dorrit, see the report of the Select Committee on Procedure (Anticipatory Motions) HC 264 (1907). See also HC Deb (1941–42) 383, cc 533–34; ibid (1968–69) 782, c 1039.
  3. 3. See HC Deb (13 December 1945) 417, c 629, where the Speaker allowed a wide debate on the Bretton Woods Agreement, and ruled that similar breadth would be out of order in debate on the second reading of the much narrower bill which immediately followed.
  4. 4. HC Deb (1945–46) 420, c 1081, and see para 19.16.
  5. 5. For example, there was a SO No 24 (then SO No 9) adjournment debate on the future of Rolls-Royce immediately after the Rolls-Royce (Purchase) Bill had been presented and set down for second reading in 1970–71 (CJ (1970–71) 246–47). In 1992–93, a motion was tabled inviting the Government to proceed with the committee stage of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, even though that committee stage had been set down as an order of the day over five months previously (ibid (1992–93) 52–53, 226). For the earlier application of the rule, see Erskine May (21st edn, 1989), pp 327–28.
  6. 6. HC Deb (1984–85) 74, c 14 and see para 19.16.