General application of legislation to Parliament

11.17The interplay between exclusive cognizance and statute law has meant it is not always clear whether statute applies to the precincts of Parliament. Actions in respect of which exclusive cognizance is claimed and has been admitted are not restricted to formal acts of either House. This privilege has been held to extend to the sale of intoxicating liquor within the precincts of the House, though those responsible did not hold a licence.1

As the Supreme Court said in the Chaytor case: ‘Following Ex p Herbert there appears to have been a presumption in Parliament that statutes do not apply to activities within the Palace of Westminster unless they expressly provide to the contrary.’2 While the Supreme Court noted ‘That presumption is open to question’, there is a history of legislative confusion. In 2002, the Treasury Solicitor issued guidance to the effect that the parliamentary authorities should be consulted on whether any legislation proposed to apply to the Crown should also apply to Parliament, but this guidance was not consistently followed. In 2013, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege noted that this had led to many inconsistencies in statute law. The Committee considered that it was not practicable to resolve these inconsistencies without sweeping retrospective change, which might have unforeseeable consequences. It concluded that, in the absence of legislation, ‘the safest way forward, however undesirable it may be as a statement of principle, is to reiterate and formalise the current presumption that legislation does not apply to Parliament unless it expressly provides otherwise.’ It recommended that each House should adopt a Resolution ‘stating that the House of Commons and the House of Lords should in future be expressly bound by legislation creating individual rights which could impinge on parliamentary activities, and that in the absence of such express provision such legislation is not binding upon Parliament.’3 Each House subsequently agreed a motion that ‘legislation creating individual rights which could impinge on the activities of the House should in future contain express provision to this effect’.4

Certain statutes in employment law may give rise to actions where acts which might otherwise be regarded as within Parliament's exclusive cognizance or might fall within the definition of ‘proceedings in Parliament’ may, depending on the particular circumstances, properly be brought before a court or tribunal. For example, some provisions relating to employment are explicitly applied to staff of both Houses by the Employment Rights Act 1996 and by virtue of that Act nothing in any rule of law or practice of Parliament is to prevent a person from bringing proceedings under the Act before an employment tribunal.5